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Employers in a variety of fields are increasingly imposing noncom-
pete agreements on their workers as a condition of the workers’ at-will 
employment.1 These employees are working at or near minimum wage, 
in positions that require little or no advanced technical skills. Major news 
sources have highlighted this issue while covering recent employment 
litigation between Jimmy Johns and a pair of its former employees.2 In 
this litigation, two plaintiffs filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive 
relief and declaratory judgment invalidating the noncompete and confi-
dentiality agreements that they signed with the sandwich maker.3 Grant-
ing defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Illinois District Court held that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege any injury.4 This 
issue is not limited to one fast food chain. In jurisdictions where em-
ployment contracts are legally enforceable, there is a growing trend 
among employers to require low-wage, unskilled workers to execute 
noncompete agreements as a condition of their at-will employment. 
The use of noncompete agreements for such positions is outside of 
the original scope and purpose of post-employment restrictive covenants. 
                                                     
 1. See Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs,      
N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-
increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs.html; Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a 
Noncompete Clause, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/upshot/ 
when-the-guy-making-your-sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0. 
 2. See David Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncom-
pete Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/10/13/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_5978180.html; see also Joe Patrice, Jimmy John’s Serves 
Up Sandwiches and Oppressive Non-Compete Agreements, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 14, 2014, 1:30 
PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/10/jimmy-johns-serves-up-sandwiches-and-oppressive-non-com 
pete-agreements/. 
 3. See, e.g., Employee Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement (Exhibit A), Brunner 
v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-05509 (2014) [hereinafter Agreement], available at 
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/FACExhibitA.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
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Noncompete agreements and other related employment covenants were 
traditionally executed between companies and skilled professionals.5 The 
general aim of these contracts was to prevent unfair competition by pro-
tecting legitimate business interests such as trade secrets.6 
This Article argues that the extension of post-employment restric-
tive covenants, specifically noncompete agreements, to workers earning 
low wages and performing unskilled work, improperly infringes on the 
workers’ constitutional right to seek better employment opportunities. 
When low-wage workers are denied the right to change employers, they 
are precluded from economic mobility while being exploited and op-
pressed.7 These particular individuals lack the bargaining power to se-
cure suitable compensation and benefits. The reality of their at-will em-
ployment leaves them with no protection from their employers terminat-
ing them without cause. Moreover, upon termination of their workers’ 
employment, employers can use the executed noncompete agreement to 
legally coerce their former employees not to obtain similar employment 
with another company. These consequences, such as the threat of legal 
coercion and infringement on the nation’s free labor system, should ren-
der the application of post-employment restrictive covenants in this con-
text a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Noncompete agreements for low-wage, unskilled labor are reminis-
cent of the Reconstruction Era’s wage-contract system that former slave 
owners used to exploit and subjugate African Americans. Often, the goal 
of former slave owners was to use wage contracts to once again subject 
newly-freed Blacks to the master-slave relationship. These binding 
agreements accomplished this goal through their domineering and op-
pressive clauses that extended beyond the labor requirements and con-
trolled every aspect of the workers’ lives.8 
The Reconstruction Era debates, subsequent legislation, and key ju-
dicial opinions reveal that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
against slavery, indentured servitude, and peonage were intended to pre-
vent injustices in wage contracts. Though Section 1 of the Amendment 
                                                     
 5. See Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsid-
eration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 
1163, 1166 (2001). 
 6. Id. at 1165. 
 7. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
437, 464 (1989) (for discussion on one lawmaker’s view that the absence of free labor degraded the 
worker); see also James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional 
Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1532 (2010) (discussing Shaw v. Fisher, 102 
S.E. 325 (S.C. 1920), and the right to change employers). 
 8. See generally AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, 
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998). 
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contains only thirty-two words,9 the debates held before, during, and af-
ter the ratification of the Amendment provide a full illustration as to what 
Congress deemed to be “fair and just labor relations.”10 The stated goal 
and related discussions around the establishment of “fair and just labor 
relations” provide a useful framework for how to identify and rectify 
power imbalances in employer-employee relationships.11 
This Article argues that contemporary noncompete agreements be-
tween employers and workers earning low wages while performing un-
skilled labor are a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Part I discuss-
es the origin and purpose of restrictive post-employment covenants and 
identifies the type of noncompete agreement at issue. Part II examines 
the original scope and intent of the Thirteenth Amendment and related 
legislation. This Part also discusses the types of imbalanced work condi-
tions denounced by the Reconstruction Era Congress as “perpetuations of 
slavery.”12 It also discusses the benefits of free, or non-enslaved, labor 
identified by Congress while illustrating why contemporary noncompete 
agreements between employers and unskilled workers are outside of that 
original purpose. Part III discusses four relevant judicial opinions regard-
ing noncompete agreements to illustrate that, at one point, the judiciary 
correctly interpreted and applied the laws to employment-related disputes 
as Congress intended. The Article concludes by arguing that courts 
should re-examine the Thirteenth Amendment and its historical context 
to hold unconstitutional noncompete agreements for low-wage, at-will, 
and unskilled employees. 
I. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF RESTRICTIVE POST-EMPLOYMENT 
COVENANTS 
A. Early Use of Restrictive Covenants in England 
Agreements restricting individuals’ post-employment options date 
back in American history to the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to post-
                                                     
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1–2 reads: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.” See VanderVelde, supra note 7, at 448–49 for a discussion re-
garding the expansive nature of the congressional debates during Reconstruction in identifying the 
“values and objectives of the thirteenth amendment” while devoting little attention to the text itself. 
VanderVelde asserts that the text of the Amendment does not exhaust the intentions of Congress and 
argues that the debates as recorded illustrate Congress’s goal of improving the status of all workers 
by: 1) “recognizing the dignity of labor”; 2) “guaranteeing workers a wide range of opportunities for 
advancement”; and 3) “raising the floor of legal rights accorded all work[ers].” Id. 
 10. VanderVelde, supra note 7, at 437. 
 11. Id. at 438. 
 12. Id. at 452. 
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employment agreement utilization in the United States, employers in 
England routinely used agreements that detailed the post-employment 
business conduct and options of apprentices.13 Under the English system, 
apprenticeship cases heard during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
generally involved what the courts deemed the improper and unethical 
motives of masters.14 As a result, early judicial opinions disfavored post-
employment restraints when masters sought to restrict the post-
employment options of their apprentices.15 
Centuries later, as the terms and conditions of apprenticeship be-
came more varied, English employers grew concerned with avoiding 
competition through the loss of trade secrets and customers. To address 
their concerns, masters began requiring the execution of post-
employment agreements by their apprentices.16 In short, masters sought 
to protect their businesses from competition levied by their former ap-
prentices. Yet, this goal directly conflicted with the aim of an apprentice: 
establishing oneself as a profitable member of a trade. 
While evaluating the flood of cases that came before them, English 
courts applied the rule of reason to evaluate the merits of the claims.17 
The rule of reason standard was used to fairly protect the employer’s in-
terests while ensuring that those protections did not interfere with public 
interests. As a result, courts often invalidated restraints on the post-
employment activity of former apprentices. English courts considered the 
notion that an apprentice could not earn a living by working in the very 
trade that he honed during his apprenticeship to be morally improper and 
outside of customary norms.18 Those courts continue to disfavor the use 
of noncompete agreements, although they tend to hold that confidentiali-
ty clauses, and non-solicitation and non-poaching agreements are valid 
under the reasonable standard. 
B. Original Purpose of Restrictive Covenants in the United States 
Courts in early American judicial opinions adopted the common 
law reasonableness test used in England to decide employee-restraint 
                                                     
 13. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 
(1960). 
 14. See generally id. 
 15. Id.; see also STANLEY, supra note 8, at 65 (discussing apprenticeships). The nature of a 
master-apprentice relationship is far different than the employer-employee relationship at issue here. 
The former is more than a commercial bargain and is a relationship built on “personal trust.” There-
fore, the terms of apprenticeships were viewed as vitally important so as to require memorialization 
in writing. 
 16. See Blake, supra note 13, at 638. 
 17. Id. at 643. 
 18. See id. at 634. 
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cases.19 American courts typically voided the agreements during the ear-
ly 1850s.20 Later court decisions began to erode that precedent.21 And by 
the late nineteenth century, courts no longer disfavored restraints on em-
ployment agreements. Instead, the permissible use of noncompete 
agreements in the majority of American jurisdictions has grown.22 Only a 
minority of state governments has outlawed restrictive employment cov-
enants.23 A large majority of states permit the use of restraints on the 
employment options of former employees.24 Generally, these restraints 
are deemed reasonable if the restraint is tailored to protect a legitimate 
business interest, does not create an undue hardship on the employee, 
and is not likely to result in injury to the public if the terms of the con-
tract are enforced.25 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, courts generally restrict-
ed noncompete agreements and other employment-related contracts to 
high-level employees whose skill or access to proprietary information 
justified such agreements.26 Businesses and corporations have legitimate 
interests in protecting their trade secrets. Those interests also extend to 
preventing company executives from being poached when it is likely to 
hurt the company’s economic value and reputation. In exchange, these 
professionals enter into employment contracts and noncompete agree-
ments. Sophisticated employees may negotiate the terms of their em-
ployment contracts and related noncompete agreements.27 These terms 
usually include the following: a definite length of employment; a set of 
identified circumstances under which that term would be voided; and 
compensation particulars, including the amounts of signing bonuses, 
yearly bonuses, salary amounts, as well as severance package details. By 
                                                     
 19. Id. at 643–44. 
 20. Id. at 644. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.; see also Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompe-
tition Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 876 (2010). 
 23. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–16602.5 (West 2015) (exceptions include cove-
nants attached to sale of goodwill of a business or upon dissolution of partnership or limited liability 
corporation); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(c) (1993); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 23:921 (2015); MONT. CODE §§ 28-2-703, 704 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-
06 (1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (1998). 
 24. The majority of states permit some use of noncompete agreements and the relevant com-
mon law findings and statutory basis originate from the reasonableness standard. Though there is a 
great deal of variety in what those jurisdictions allow, the purpose of this Article is not to address the 
nuances of each jurisdiction. Instead, the goal here is to identify the unfair and improper use of re-
strictive covenants on the post-employment options of low-wage, unskilled workers. For a discus-
sion regarding the range of permissible restrictions on noncompetes, see generally Moffat, supra 
note 22. 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). 
 26. See Blake, supra note 13, at 687; see also Moffat, supra note 22, at 900–02. 
 27. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 1213 n.174. 
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executing the noncompete agreement, the skilled professional customari-
ly agrees not to work for any competitor of the employer within a certain 
geographic range for a specified period of time. The employment con-
tracts that these parties execute have generally been enforceable in juris-
dictions where courts recognize such contracts.28 
By contrast, the typical at-will employees discussed in this Article 
earn minimum wage and are not granted access to any trade secrets or 
legitimate business interests. The employer in such instances can likely 
make no plausible claim that the job responsibilities delegated to the em-
ployees at issue result in the entrustment of legitimate business interests 
worthy of legal protection. Restraints on the employment opportunities 
for low and minimum wage employees only exacerbate their existing 
economic hardships. Individuals earning such wages through full-time 
employment must learn to survive while living at or near the federal pov-
erty-income guidelines. Finally, binding workers to these post-
employment agreements causes numerous and lasting injury to the pub-
lic. Society as a whole suffers when individuals who are willing and able 
to work are precluded from securing subsequent employment by using 
their established job experience to earn a living. 
Although it is not the focus of this Article, there is a strong argu-
ment that the use of noncompete agreements for employees who only 
earn a paltry wage, and for whom no advanced skill is required, fails to 
comport with the established rule of reason.29 
C. Extended Use of Noncompete Agreements in the United States for 
Low-Wage, Low-Skilled Labor 
Despite the troubling nature of subjecting low-wage workers to the 
restrictions of noncompete agreements, the types of jobs that now require 
them include seasonal workers at neighborhood summer camps, sand-
wich makers at Jimmy Johns, hair stylists, yoga instructors, and low-
wage home health aide workers.30 These agreements generally require 
that employees agree not to work for one to two years for any competi-
tors. Many, but not all, of the agreements impose some geographical pa-
rameters that do not allow former employees to work for competitors 
within a specified number of miles. The contracts may also specify an 
amount of liquidated damages purportedly agreed upon by the parties at 
                                                     
 28. See sources cited supra note 22. 
 29. Though restrictions on post-employment activity for employees have customarily been 
drafted to comply with the reasonableness test and its progeny, noncompete agreements executed 
between employers and low-wage workers are far different from traditional noncompete agreements. 
Instead, the plight of these workers is eerily akin to that of the destitute working class seeking em-
ployment in both ante- and post-bellum America. 
 30. See, e.g., Agreement, supra note 3; Greenhouse, supra note 1. 
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the outset. In jurisdictions where restrictive post-employment covenants 
are allowed, courts usually allow agreements that contain both time and 
geographic restrictions to stand.31 Even when agreements lack those key 
components, some jurisdictions allow judges to revise portions of the 
agreement to ensure that it complies with the applicable law instead of 
voiding the entire agreement.32 
Consider the following post-employment covenant that resulted in 
litigation. A young woman, Anita Walsh,33 was employed as a home 
health aide by a locally owned home health agency. Her job duties in-
volved assisting one client with their activities of daily living: bathing, 
dressing, taking medications, light cleaning, and cooking. For this work, 
she earned approximately $10,100 per year. Ms. Walsh is the sole care-
giver responsible for rearing her young teenage child. Although she did 
not receive her high school diploma, Ms. Walsh successfully obtained 
her GED. 
After being employed by the agency for several weeks, Ms. Walsh 
went to pick up her paycheck as she had done on prior paydays. On this 
particular occasion, an office assistant handed her a set of documents that 
she was asked to sign before her paycheck would be released. Although 
the assistant was the one presenting the documents to be signed, she 
made it clear that she was not able to answer any questions about the 
content and meaning of those documents. Ms. Walsh was simply told to 
sign the papers in exchange for her paycheck. Without a lawyer or hu-
man resources personnel to provide guidance, Anita signed the docu-
ments and left with her paycheck. 
Several more months passed and, though it was difficult to make 
ends meet financially, Ms. Walsh continued to work diligently for her 
                                                     
 31. See, e.g., Jon P. McClanahan & Kimberly M. Burke, Sharpening the Blunt Blue Pencil: 
Renewing the Reasons for Covenants Not to Compete in North Carolina, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1931, 1934 
(2012). 
 32. Some jurisdictions empower jurists to modify noncompete agreements instead of voiding 
them entirely. This process is commonly referred to as “blue-penciling” the agreement so as to make 
it reasonable. Id. at 1933. (“[T]he acceptance of covenants not to compete in contract law is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. Initially at common law, such covenants were disallowed because they 
represented invalid restraints on trade. Courts were wary that restrictive covenants would negatively 
impact competition, encourage monopolies, and drive up prices.”); see also Raimonde v. Van 
Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546–47 (Ohio 1975) (“In practice, however, the [blue pencil] test has not 
worked well. Because it precludes modification or amendment of contracts, the entire contract fails 
if offending provisions cannot be stricken. . . . Thus, many courts have abandoned the ‘blue pencil’ 
test in favor of a rule of ‘reasonableness,’ which permits courts to determine, on the basis of all 
available evidence, what restrictions would be reasonable between the parties.”). 
 33. The name and certain nonessential details related to the individual’s case have been 
changed in the interest of protecting his or her identity. The individual is a former client of the au-
thor. Factual details regarding the type of contracts executed along with their terms essential to this 
Article have not been changed. 
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client with the hope that a better job with the potential of earning more 
money would eventually present itself. After recovering from a non-
work-related injury that kept her out of work at the employer’s request, 
she eagerly called the agency and requested to return to work once she 
was well. To her surprise, Ms. Walsh was told she would need to com-
plete the lengthy application process again before she could be “re-
hired.” 
Fortunately, another local home health agency was hiring immedi-
ately. This company had a better reputation among customers. In fact, the 
one client Ms. Walsh serviced was now receiving care from this more 
reputable agency. Additionally, aides reported earning more money and 
being treated far better. Most importantly, the other agency had an im-
mediate opening. In a matter of two days, Ms. Walsh was hired. 
Nearly nine months after being constructively terminated by the ini-
tial agency, Ms. Walsh received a certified letter in the mail. She later 
discovered it was a summons and complaint filed on behalf of her former 
employer. They were suing her for breach of contract and breach of a 
nonsolicitation agreement. The documents Anita had signed in exchange 
for her paycheck all those months ago were related to post-employment 
restrictions for which her signature indicated her assent to pay liquidated 
damages in the amount of $10,000—roughly her entire pay for the year. 
The former agency essentially sought repayment of Ms. Walsh’s full sal-
ary in the form of damages for the alleged breach. 
Without money to afford an attorney, Ms. Walsh reached out to her 
local Legal Aid Office for legal assistance. Legal Aid was able to suc-
cessfully make a referral to outside counsel for legal help on a pro bono 
basis. The Answer and Affirmative Defenses filed on behalf of Ms. 
Walsh pointed to the unconscionable and unconstitutional nature of the 
contracts the agency sought to enforce. Counsel for the agency quickly 
sought to resolve the matter outside of court. Though the case was favor-
ably resolved for Ms. Walsh, other former employees of this agency had 
default judgments levied against them after they were unable to obtain 
legal counsel. 
Also consider the nineteen- or twenty-year old young woman who 
has never been employed. She has a high school diploma, or its equiva-
lency, but no other job training or employable skills. After submitting an 
application for employment with a fast food sandwich chain in her 
neighborhood, she is hired to work part-time for minimum wage and 
without any benefits. As a condition of her at-will employment, the 
young woman is required to sign an agreement that prohibits her from 
working for another food service business for a period of two years after 
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her current employment terminates.34 The agreement prohibits her from 
working at any food service company where 10% of the menu is com-
prised of sandwiches within a three-mile radius of her current employ-
ment.35 It also prohibits her from working at any other franchise location 
within the company for a period of one year after the termination of her 
current employment.36 Unfortunately, the prohibition against the young 
woman’s subsequent employment is not dependent upon whether or not 
she voluntarily ceases to work for her current employer. In fact, it also 
does not take into account whether or not the initial employer has a via-
ble business that can continue to maintain its workforce without the need 
to downsize or shutter its doors altogether. Under either circumstance, 
should our hypothetical worker find herself in need of a new job, the one 
position that she is presumably now qualified to hold is available to her 
only if she is willing to pay the amount of liquidated damages mandated 
by the noncompete agreement. As is discussed in the next Part, her situa-
tion is precisely what the Reconstruction Era Congress intended to out-
law with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
II. PURPOSE OF THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND SUBSEQUENT 
LEGISLATION 
A. Congress Acts to Establish Free Labor in America 
Issues regarding race, class, and labor were heavily considered by 
post-colonial American leaders.37 Reconciling the nation’s moral procliv-
ities regarding personal autonomy and freedom with what had become 
the national custom of subjugating a race of people in exchange for ex-
tremely inexpensive or free labor was not a simple task.38 After years of 
dedicated activism from abolitionists and labor reformists, the Recon-
struction Congress, under the leadership of President Lincoln, tackled the 
issues of slavery and economic mobility. The Thirteenth Amendment, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,39 and the Peonage Abolition Act of 186740 
                                                     
 34. Agreement, supra note 3. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See VanderVelde, supra note 7, at 438 (discussing the congressional debates that occurred 
some twenty years prior to Reconstruction). 
 38. See STANLEY, supra note 8, at 60–96. See generally DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF 
WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991). 
 39. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)). For a 
detailed account of The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the President’s veto messages, and the votes in the 
Congress to override, see E. MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING 
THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 74–81 (1880). 
 40. Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1994 
(2012)). 
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were enacted to specifically address these issues. Though some con-
gressmen believed it improper and impractical to abolish slavery, a ma-
jority of the legislators recognized that simultaneously addressing labor 
concerns while eradicating the practice of owning another human being 
as property was the best approach.41 As a result, the legislation enacted 
by Congress was designed to address the needs of both black and    
working-class Americans of all races. 
The congressional debates before and after the passage of the Re-
construction Amendments support the position that the Thirteenth 
Amendment accomplishes more than simply abolishing chattel slavery 
and indentured servitude. A close analysis of the debates illuminates a 
less recognized goal of the Amendment: to establish a national standard 
for labor rights in America.42 Inclusion of the phrase “involuntary servi-
tude” was a nod to pro-labor sentiments of American voters while also 
appeasing legislators who sought to pass legislation not solely focused on 
Blacks.43 In short, while the pronouncement against slave labor boldly 
rejected ownership of human beings, that pronouncement was closely 
intertwined with an overarching desire to set the tone and expectation of 
labor reform generally. For that reason, the text of the debates includes 
more than discussions concerning the enslavement of Blacks and the in-
dentured service of the poor. There are instances in the text where pro-
ponents of the Thirteenth Amendment affirmatively disavow any alle-
giance to or concern for Blacks. While debating the extent of rights con-
ferred upon the freedmen, Senator Yates sought to qualify his support for 
equality across races by proclaiming, “I never had ‘negro on the 
brain.’”44 Essential to the point of this Article is the fact that the legisla-
tors engaged in detailed discussions about the need to establish free labor 
across the land—including the nonslaveholding states in the North. 
Judicial interpretation and application of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment further establish that the Amendment was passed to go beyond the 
abolishment of chattel slavery and indentured servitude. Indeed, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that, in addition to abolishing the 
explicitly identified practices, the Thirteenth Amendment also eradicates 
all “badges and incidents” of slavery.45 Additionally, and specifically 
related to this argument, the nation’s high court has found the threat of 
                                                     
 41. Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition of 
Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1636 (2012). 
 42. VanderVelde, supra note 7, at 438–39. 
 43. Id. at 450 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (remarks of Sen. 
Dolittle and Sen. Sumner)). 
 44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 105 (1866).  
 45. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). 
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legal coercion to be an infringement on the protections provided by the 
Thirteenth Amendment.46 
 
B. Post-Civil War Tension Between the Right to Contract and Free La-
bor 
An individual’s inability to execute binding contracts was a telltale 
sign of his or her status as a slave.47 The institution of slavery in America 
was premised on the inability of African Americans to control any aspect 
of their lives. Of particular importance, enslaved African Americans 
were not permitted to enter into contracts. Indeed, “slavery constituted 
‘an obligation to labour for the benefit of the master, without the contract 
or consent of the servant.’”48 In contrast, working class whites and free 
blacks in the North often entered into what are known as “wage con-
tracts” to receive payment for their labor.49 Unless the length of the em-
ployment relationship was expected to last for one year or more, it was 
customary for these contracts to be unwritten. 
The traditional and fundamental notions of contracts were seen as 
the antithesis of slavery and were used by abolitionists in their quest to 
eradicate slavery. Abolitionists saw successfully attaining the right to 
receive wages in exchange for former slave labor as a true symbol of 
freedom. Labor reformists, however, were not persuaded. 
Advocates for labor reform and abolitionists profoundly disagreed 
about the fundamental nature and ultimate effect of wage contracts. La-
bor reformists often compared the plight of the poor working-class 
whites with that of slave labor. According to reformists, although wage 
contracts purportedly separated slavery from freedom,50 this quasi-
freedom was a fallacy because essential contractual elements were ab-
sent. These elements included voluntary consent and an equivalent ex-
change of goods or wages in return for labor. 
Labor reformists contended that spending the majority of one’s life 
working for the benefit of another’s financial gain was the equivalent of 
enslavement.51 The nature of the wage contracts and the expectation of 
the landowner-employers required laborers to relinquish their personal 
autonomy and economic independence. Instead of becoming an equal 
party to the contract with laborers, employers continued to exploit the 
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laborers in a manner that led to subjugation and domination. For this rea-
son, the purported parties to wage contracts were not on equal footing.52 
Labor reformists argued that employers continued to operate as masters 
while laborers remained in bondage. 
In contrast, Northern abolitionists considered these contracts to be 
progress toward freedom for slaves. They believed the labor movement’s 
attack against what the reformists referred to as “wage slavery” for 
whites undermined abolitionist efforts to highlight the genuine horrors of 
chattel slavery.53 William Garrison and his close followers, while making 
the distinction between chattel slaves and wage laborers, often equated 
the treatment of slaves with that of the treatment given to domestic ani-
mals.54 In contrast, he viewed wage laborers as “free agents” who could 
move independently at their own pleasure while earning income for their 
labor.55 The aim was to utilize the concept of wage labor to lend credibil-
ity to the abolitionist movement. Northerners worked to firmly create a 
system by which Blacks in the South could earn wages for their labor 
immediately following emancipation. 
Legislators in Congress continued to seek resolutions to America’s 
antebellum labor issue. Congressional debates illustrate that one purpose 
of the Thirteenth Amendment was to end “inequitable labor practices.”56 
As comprehensively detailed by Alexander Tsesis, the debates from 
1864–1865 support the assertion that proponents of the Amendment were 
committed “to protecting civil liberties” and abolishing slavery.57 Abol-
ishing slavery became Congress’s only viable solution to rectifying the 
unfair leverage slave owners had when bargaining over the labor rates of 
white workers.58 The inherently inexpensive nature of slave labor left 
white workers seeking employment little or no room to negotiate for liv-
able wages. The debates reveal that Congress aimed to provide “civil 
freedoms” to all races.59 The Amendment passed the Senate on April 8, 
1864, with only six senators voting against the measure.60 The House of 
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Representatives bill, passed on January 31, 1865, had a closer margin of 
119 to 56.61 
Notwithstanding the freedoms conferred on working-class Ameri-
cans through the Thirteenth Amendment, attempts to implement those 
freedoms were fraught with missteps and shortcomings. The Bureau of 
Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands was instituted to assist for-
mer slaves with the transition into their new freedom.62 One professed 
goal of the Bureau was to benefit Blacks by securing wages and stable 
employment.63 The use of wage contracts to achieve that goal was un-
dermined by the inherently racist beliefs of pro-abolitionists and former 
slaveholders alike. General Oliver O. Howard, Commissioner of the Bu-
reau, shamelessly promoted wage contracts with the myopic notion that 
“‘[i]f [former slaves] can be induced to enter into contracts, they are 
taught that there are duties as well as privileges of freedom.’”64 This 
seemingly paternalistic aim failed to recognize what could have been the 
true benefit of post-emancipation wage contracts: preventing white land-
owners from using threats and violence to obtain unrecompensed labor 
from Blacks. 
Despite the admonition of the Thirteenth Amendment against slav-
ery and involuntary servitude, the Freedmen’s Bureau often forced for-
mer slaves into wage contracts, once again subjecting Blacks to harsh 
working conditions and compensation terms that largely benefited white 
landowners.65 Blacks sought to avoid entering into written contracts for 
their labor, as they were keenly aware that the contracts revoked their 
recently acquired freedom.66 Those recently emancipated by legal decree 
understood that true freedom existed only when they were able to own 
and work their own land.67 Southern landowners, convinced of their ra-
cial and legal superiority, were also displeased with executing contracts 
with “niggers.”68 As a result, the contracts often created by white land-
owners captured their self-perceived position of authority in writing.69 
For instance, wage contracts often included language that reinforced the 
subservient status of black workers in a way that demeaned their status as 
                                                     
 61. Id. 
 62. See Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507; see also ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 56 (1988). 
 63. See PAUL A. CIMBALA, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN 
SOUTH AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 11 (2005). 
 64. STANLEY, supra note 8, at 36. 
 65. FONER, supra note 62, at 166. 
 66. STANLEY, supra note 8, at 40. 
 67. Id. at 41. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 41–42. 
2016] The Paradox of the Right to Contract 971 
free and provided the landowner with authority over the personal lives 
and off-duty activities of their employees.70 
The contracts contained clauses that rendered wage labor identical 
to slavery with “tyrannical provisions” that went far beyond the terms for 
labor to be performed and sought to control every aspect of the workers’ 
lives.71 The Bureau permitted, in some instances, free Blacks to sign con-
tracts with forfeiture clauses that allowed the employer to exercise dis-
cretion on when a worker’s conduct merited the full forfeiture of wages. 
This clause was often a pretext that allowed the employer to receive free 
labor.72 In essence, the laborers received no benefit of the bargain and 
continued to be subjected to exploitation and domination. The goal of 
written contracts to establish freedmens’ “rights in the market”73 had 
been perversely used to take away those rights. In spite of the explicitly 
oppressive clauses contained in the contracts, Freedmen Bureau agents 
successfully expanded the use of written wage contracts by “partly per-
suading and partly threatening” Blacks into signing the agreements.74 
Landowners also created agreements among themselves to undercut 
the autonomy of employees to create their own financial security.75 As 
detailed in the 1866 Congressional debates, a group of farmers in Turkey 
Island, Virginia, created the James River Farmers Compact to establish 
classes of workers and associated wage rates for all employers in the re-
gion.76 The agreement also dictated such details as the number of days 
each worker had to work per month (allowing them only four days off 
out of a thirty-day month); the requirement that all workers tend to ani-
mals on Sundays as well as holidays; the frequency with which workers 
were to be paid; and a prohibition against a new employer hiring an em-
ployee previously fired for what was loosely defined as misconduct 
and/or contract violations.77 This resolution clearly protected landowners 
from competing with each other78 for employees as there was no risk of a 
worker leaving one employer for another for better wages and benefits; 
they were uniform throughout the area. Of equal importance was the ef-
fect the resolution had on the workers. They were essentially relegated to 
their previous subservient status as servants. Indeed, the James River 
Farmers Compact explicitly equated the work to be performed with slav-
                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. CIMBALA, supra note 63, at 157–58. 
 73. STANLEY, supra note 8, at 56. 
 74. Id. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 517 (1866). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. VanderVelde, supra note 7, at 491. 
972 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:957 
ery by stating: “All of the hands will be required to submit to such rules, 
and work in such [a] way and at such times, either night or day, as was 
formerly customary in this section of the country.”79 
This ownership dynamic of the post-emancipation employment re-
lationship permeated areas outside of Turkey Island, Virginia. Both crim-
inal and civil laws were enacted to prevent employers from “enticing” 
away their laborers.80 The text from congressional sessions at the time 
reveals senators’ objections to such actions deemed to treat employees as 
property while creating conditions that “continued degradation and op-
pression.”81 The ultimate goal of the Reconstruction Congress, before 
and after the passage of Thirteenth Amendment, was to avoid the nullifi-
cation of rights intended to be conferred by the Amendment.82 
C. Legislative Enforcement of Free Labor 
Finding a solution to the labor problem in America continued to 
pose a great challenge for the country’s leaders. Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to give federal authority to the concept of free-
dom through the right to contract. Senator Trumbull, author of the Civil 
Rights Act, sought to turn the “abstract truths” of the Thirteenth 
Amendment into “practical freedom” with the Act delineating “where 
freedom ceases and slavery begins.”83 On a quest to “obliterate the last 
lingering vestiges of the slave system,”84 Congress also enacted the Pe-
onage Abolition Act of 1867. The anti-peonage legislation provided fed-
eral protection to free labor against infringement by both private individ-
uals and state action.85 As described below, early wage-contract chal-
lenges utilized both the Thirteenth Amendment and the Peonage Aboli-
tion Act to challenge the unjust employment covenants. These cases re-
veal that, similar to the practical implications of contemporary noncom-
pete agreements at issue in this Article, the penalties workers faced for 
not meeting the terms of the contracts amounted to specific perfor-
mance.86 The stakes were enormously high in the early wage-contract 
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cases. The former employees were routinely subjected to lengthy prison 
terms as a penalty of quitting a job prior to the end of the contract term.87 
State governments elevated what should have been simple breach of con-
tract cases into criminal violations by making it prima facie evidence of 
an employee’s intent to defraud an employer when the employee failed 
to complete the job over the dictated time period and/or failed to return 
any pay advances given at the time of executing the contract.88 
Nearly twenty years after the Emancipation Proclamation, the ques-
tion of how to create and maintain free labor in the United States persist-
ed. In 1883, Congress conducted an investigation into the problems and 
stagnate progress of establishing a free labor system.89 The study’s aim 
was to examine the “whole question of the relations between labor and 
capital and the troubles between them.”90 The hearings revealed that the 
free contract system created an unanticipated conflict once slavery end-
ed.91 Though wage labor was not equivalent to chattel slavery, elements 
of dominion and subjugation persisted for white workers such that “[t]he 
working people fe[lt] they [were] under a system of forced slavery.”92 A 
subsequent congressional investigation found that peonage was a perva-
sive problem, as it existed in every American state except for Connecti-
cut and Oklahoma.93 
D. Judicial Enforcement of Thirteenth Amendment 
Early judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Peonage Abolition Act provides insightful guidance to courts now tasked 
with adjudicating the legality of noncompete agreements for low-wage 
workers. Recognizing that all employment relationships should comply 
with the “spirit and intent”94 of the Thirteenth Amendment, principles 
gleaned from a quartet of cases are important when evaluating the consti-
tutionality of post-employment restrictive covenants. These principles 
include: (1) identifying the existence of peonage when indebted workers 
are compelled to perform service to satisfy that debt; (2) acknowledging 
that free labor is not possible when workers are subjected to involuntary 
servitude; (3) declaring excessive penalties for breach of contract actions 
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unconstitutional when those penalties give rise to slavery or peonage; 
and, (4) protecting the right of employees to change employers. These 
four key principles are violated when low-wage workers enter into non-
compete agreements, whether or not the initial execution of the agree-
ment was voluntary. 
1. Performance of Service to Pay Debt Is Peonage—Regardless of Voli-
tion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Clyatt v. United States to 
decide two relevant questions: (1) how peonage is defined and (2) if 
Congress had authority to enact the Peonage Abolition Act.95 Samuel 
Clyatt appealed his conviction in federal court for returning two African-
American men, Will Gordon and Mose Ridley, to peonage in order to 
work off a debt owed to Clyatt and his business partners.96 The Court 
defined peonage as both “compulsory service [and] involuntary servi-
tude” without regard to whether or not the debtor voluntarily entered into 
the contract in question.97 Though the definition of peonage was not as 
important to the essential issue before the Court—whether Clyatt was 
properly convicted of “returning” Gordon and Ridley to a state of peon-
age—the Court went to considerable lengths to make it clear that the im-
proper state of peonage could exist even if the debtor voluntarily agreed 
to exchange his or her labor as payment of the debt.98 In short, the dis-
tinction of voluntary or involuntary peonage identifies only how the 
agreement came about; it does nothing to justify the condition of peon-
age itself. 
As to the second question, the Court found that the ratification of 
the Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the authority to enforce that 
amendment with legislation, including the Peonage Abolition Act, in or-
der to achieve the constitutional goal of establishing universal freedom 
for all citizens.99 The Court also denounced involuntary servitude and 
peonage regardless of whether it arises between private individuals or 
between an individual and the state.100 
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2. Involuntary Servitude Undermines the Establishment of Free Labor 
The issue of wage contracts and the Thirteenth Amendment reached 
the Supreme Court again six years later in Bailey v. Alabama.101 Alonzo 
Bailey asserted that the criminalization of his failure to comply with the 
terms of a contract for his labor violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.102 Mr. Bailey entered into a yearlong contract to work as a 
farm hand.103 At the time of being hired, the employer provided Bailey 
with a fifteen-dollar advance that was to be deducted in increments of 
$1.25 from his monthly salary. After working for a little over one month, 
Mr. Bailey stopped working104 for the landowner and did not refund the 
remaining $13.75 of the advance. Mr. Bailey was indicted and subse-
quently found guilty of violating Alabama’s criminal statute. He was or-
dered to pay damages in the amount of fifteen dollars as well as a thirty-
dollar fine plus costs.105 Mr. Bailey was then sentenced to twenty days of 
hard labor in lieu of the fine and 116 days in jail instead of court costs. 
While a major issue in the case centered on the criminal statute 
used to imprison Mr. Bailey, the Court stated that “[t]here is no more 
important concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which 
alone can enduring prosperity be based.”106 The Court also expounded 
upon the significance and breadth of involuntary servitude by defining 
the aim of the Thirteenth Amendment to “abolish slavery of whatever 
name . . . and all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any state 
of bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the 
personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s bene-
fit.”107 The Court’s opinion in Bailey not only recognized the need to pro-
tect each citizen’s right to free labor, but also explicitly identified inden-
tured servitude as a threat to the same. 
3. Breach of Contract Penalties Must Not Amount to Slavery or Peonage 
In 1920, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed an employ-
ee’s right to change employers in Shaw v. Fisher.108 John Shaw, a land-
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owner, sued A.D. Fisher for interfering with his employment contract 
with an employee, Mr. Carver. Mr. Shaw alleged that Mr. Fisher knew 
about his existing one-year written contract with Mr. Carver.109 Mr. 
Carver testified that he worked for approximately three months before 
deciding to switch employers.110 The change was motivated by greater 
flexibility, allowing Mr. Carver to work for Fisher while also allowing 
him time to work for others. Mr. Carver also testified about the exploita-
tive treatment he suffered while working for Shaw. 
The court in Shaw found that the South Carolina statute authorizing 
the action initiated by Shaw conflicted with the spirit and intent of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.111 Citing Bailey, the court also found that voli-
tion at the start of the contractual relationship is not germane to the anal-
ysis when determining if the compulsion to serve as payment for a debt 
exists.112 The court also found that a debtor could be legally required to 
pay only actual damages suffered by the employer.113 Finally, the court 
discussed the practical realities that would arise should employees be 
coerced into choosing between working for oppressive employers and 
starvation.114 The court explained that the prohibition against slavery ap-
plied to both direct and indirect actions that lead to slave-like conditions. 
Legal consequences for breach of contract are constitutional, provided 
they do not amount to slavery or peonage. 
4. Right to Change Employers Provides Essential Power to Employees 
In 1944, more than thirty years after Bailey, the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of wage contracts in Pollock v. Wil-
liams.115 Emanuel Pollock received a five-dollar advance from a corpora-
tion at the start of his employment and failed to repay the advance after 
failing to perform according to the terms of the contract.116 After plead-
ing guilty to the criminal charge against him, Mr. Pollock was sentenced 
to sixty days in jail in lieu of paying a $100 fine. A writ of habeas corpus 
asserted that the conviction violated the Thirteenth Amendment, the Pe-
onage Abolition Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment.117 In its opinion, 
the Supreme Court described the Thirteenth Amendment and the Peon-
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age Abolition Act as a “shield and a sword” against forced labor caused 
by debt.118 
The Pollock Court also held that the central purpose of the Thir-
teenth Amendment and Peonage Abolition Act was to create and “main-
tain a system of completely free and voluntary labor.”119 The Court ex-
plained that free labor exists only when employees have power to control 
their employment conditions, thereby incentivizing employers to refrain 
from exploiting employees.120 One way to confer power to employees is 
to afford them the right to change employers.121 The Court further ex-
plained that providing employees with the right to change employers not 
only benefits the individual worker, but also benefits society as a whole 
by stimulating healthy competition among employers in the market-
place.122 
Finally, the Court in Pollock detailed the financial burden endured 
by the employee as a result of receiving a five-dollar advance.123 In ex-
change for failing to repay such a paltry sum of money, Mr. Pollock was 
required to post a $500 bond “quite regularly”124 as he appealed his case 
to the Supreme Court. The Court also recognized his $100 fine was the 
equivalent of charging the employee twenty dollars for each dollar he 
received as an advance.125 And notably, the Court acknowledged that 
judicial relief from this constitutional violation would not have been pos-
sible for Mr. Pollock without the assistance of legal counsel.126 
The presence and analysis of criminal statutes in many of the 
aforementioned cases should not detract from their applicability to con-
temporary noncompete agreements between employers and low-wage 
workers. The absence of criminal penalties in the current context of these 
agreements does not negate the exploitation and oppression endured by 
members of the poor working class subjected to them. State-sanctioned 
government approval through judicial approval of the same (via civil 
judgments), and even mere legal coercion by individual employers, 
nonetheless amount to a constitutional violation. 
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III. CONTEMPORARY LOW-WAGE NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS VIOLATE 
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Employers of low-wage workers enjoy authority and stature strik-
ingly similar to southern landowners. By virtue of their positions and the 
terms of employment agreements, employers from both eras bear virtual-
ly no burden or risk in their respective contractual arrangements. Like 
workers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contemporary 
workers bound by noncompete agreements assume all of the risk when 
entering into restrictive employment covenants. Specifically, they can be 
terminated without cause at the whim of their employer. They are bound 
to contracts that limit their ability to seek higher wages and/or better 
working conditions with a nearby, similarly situated employer. And, they 
are subjected to harsh penalties, such as forfeiting virtually all of their 
income or more in the form of judgments for specious damages should 
they fail to adhere to their contracts. In short, noncompete agreements 
unconstitutionally thwart the ability of workers earning low wages for 
unskilled labor to explore the benefits of working in a free labor society. 
Improper constraints on free labor persist when these agreements exist. 
Reliance on the doctrine of assent regarding the voluntary nature of 
an employee signature on restrictive post-employment covenants is mis-
guided.127 The Supreme Court has found that the volition of the employ-
ee at the time of signing is not germane to the constitutional analysis.128 
When the circumstances rise to indentured servitude or peonage, the na-
tion’s legislative and judicial branches have unequivocally espoused an 
appropriate level of paternalism in protecting individuals from being sub-
jected to those unbalanced positions of power.129 
As seen in the instance of Ms. Walsh, individuals may sign an em-
ployment covenant without any physical coercion. However, the mere 
presence of her signature should not be interpreted as voluntarily agree-
ing to the terms of the document. Unfortunately, there is a great risk that 
employees earning low wages for unskilled labor are not afforded the 
time or resources to ascertain what they are agreeing to. And in the event 
that workers do fully understand the terms of the agreement, the choice 
between earning some money rather no money is not really a choice at 
all. 
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Moreover, involuntary servitude, including the performance of ser-
vice through legal coercion,130 is counterproductive to the establishment 
of free labor. Assuming arguendo that Ms. Walsh was fully aware of the 
terms of the agreement, being forced to remain employed with the first 
agency under the threat of legal action renders her service involuntary. 
Such predicaments are precisely those contemplated and prohibited by 
the Thirteenth Amendment.131 
Additionally, the penalties low-wage employees are confronted 
with if a court finds them in breach of an executed noncompete agree-
ment amount to involuntary servitude and, in some instances, peonage. 
The financial burden imposed on an individual who chooses to change 
employers in the form of purported damages is substantial considering 
her classification as a low-wage earner. In the case of Ms. Walsh, the 
liquidated damage clause of the post-employment restrictive covenants 
amounted to more than her net yearly salary. As recognized by the Pol-
lock Court, this burden does not even begin to account for the costs asso-
ciated with defending her interests against a civil action for breach of 
contract had she not secured free legal representation. An employer who 
elects to enforce the agreement has the option to saddle former employ-
ees with an enormous amount of debt that the individual will be coerced 
into working off, thus subjecting them to peonage. Consequently, the 
noncompete agreements at issue expose employees to improper legal 
coercion. The execution of the agreement places the employee in the po-
sition of choosing to continue to work in undesirable conditions or hav-
ing no income at all. 
Noncompete agreements are designed to deny employees the right 
to change employers. As detailed in Pollock, free and voluntary labor can 
exist only when employers have an incentive to avoid exploiting em-
ployees because the employees have control over their job conditions.132 
Employees who earn low wages are generally viewed as dispensable. 
Millions are in need of jobs and opportunities for employment are rela-
tively few. Employees and employers alike recognize the precarious situ-
ation these employees have been placed in: comply with the demands 
and expectations of an employer, no matter how oppressive, or be re-
placed. To avoid this level of exploitation, employees must be afforded 
the right to change employers freely. 
The alternative reduces what began as an at-will employment rela-
tionship to involuntary servitude. Employees agree to work at the pleas-
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ure of the employer as these agreements state that these jobs are at-will. 
To contractually bind individuals, who desire to switch employers, re-
quires them to provide service for the employer, solely for the employ-
er’s benefit. The Bailey Court specifically found such employment dy-
namics to be a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition 
against involuntary servitude.133 Most importantly, should employees 
choose to seek better employment utilizing their job history and experi-
ence, they will likely violate the terms of the agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
In jurisdictions where post-employment restrictions are permitted, 
local courts must strike down agreements that infringe on the constitu-
tional rights of workers. Agreements have been created by individual 
employers, and sanctioned by some states, to undercut any progress the 
federal government has taken to achieve that goal. This is especially true 
in the context of post-employment restrictive covenants for low-wage, 
unskilled labor. The use of noncompete agreements in that context falls 
outside of the original purpose of the contracts: to protect a legitimate 
business interest of the employer. Preventing low-wage employees from 
seeking better job opportunities is not a legitimate business interest. To 
the contrary, post-employment restrictive covenants prevent economic 
mobility for the lowest wage earners in America. Indeed, the mere inser-
tion of these contracts into the employment relationship can have a 
chilling effect on the employee’s motivation to seek opportunities for 
advancement. And when employers seek to enforce the agreements, 
courts must recognize that the agreements violate low-wage workers’ 
constitutional rights conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment. However, 
sole reliance on judicial remedies will likely lead to a patchwork of in-
consistent rulings, precisely what our nation’s leaders sought to avoid 
when establishing citizens’ labor rights during Reconstruction. To that 
end, Congress also has the power and responsibility to address this issue. 
Free and voluntary labor was the primary goal of the Reconstruc-
tion Era Congress.134 As such, the Thirteenth Amendment conferred on 
the federal government the authority to assert federal principles and goals 
on an issue previously regulated on a state-by-state basis.135 As a result, 
Congress has the authority to eliminate the use of noncompete agree-
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ments between employers and low-wage employees.136 To the extent in-
dividual states continue to permit the enforcement of noncompete 
agreements between employers and low-wage workers, Congress should 
not hesitate to exercise the authority conferred upon it by the Thirteenth 
Amendment to attain its goal of establishing a free labor market in Amer-
ica. Unless this practice is eradicated, attempts by the poor working class 
to shed the “vestiges of slavery and involuntary servitude”137 by achiev-
ing economic mobility and freedom will continue to be thwarted. 
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